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REORGANIZATION OF FIRMS AND LABOR MARKET INEQUALITY
by Assar Lindbeck and Dennis J. Snower
*
Much of the history of economic enterprise has involved reaping the benefits from
specialization of labor by dividing increasingly fragmented tasks among different
employees - as vividly described already by Adam Smith in his Wealth of Nations. This
development was greatly facilitated through the rise of “Tayloristic organizations,” where
standardized inputs are processed to yield standardized outputs, and where different
functional tasks (e.g. administration, production, marketing, design) are performed in
different departments, coordinated through a hierarchy of managers. These organizations -
common in both the manufacturing and service sectors - testified to the importance of
specialization of work, in production as well as organization.
This pervasive organizational structure is now in retreat. Charlie Chaplin at the
conveyor belt, in the movie Modern Times, is no longer the prototype worker. With
hindsight, the wave of change began well over a decade ago; it has accelerated in recent
years, and may be expected to gather even more pace over the next decade. The
organization of many firms in both the manufacturing and service sectors is being
progressively restructured. This process calls into question the need for extreme
specialization by skill-specific occupation, creates demands for new combinations of skills,
and thereby leads to new patterns of wage inequality.
The restructuring process is characterized by a number of complementary features.
1
First, the organizational structure of firms is becoming flatter: the new structure is built
around teams that report to the central management, with few if any intermediaries.
Second, production processes are being transformed: the application of computer
technology, flexible tools, and programmable, multi-task equipment reduces returns to
scale and permits greater production flexibility. Third, the flow of information within firms
has been revolutionized: the introduction of computerized data systems permits more
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individualized treatment of employees and customers, facilitates the decentralization of
decision making, and enables employees to perform multiple tasks and exploit
complementarities among them. Fourth, firms offer broader product lines in smaller
quantities, responding more readily to customers’ requirements: customer participation in
product design is growing and there is greater emphasis on product quality and ancillary
services. And fifth, the nature of work is changing: occupational boundaries are breaking
down as workers engage in multi-tasking and work rotation. These various aspects
distinguish the traditional, Tayloristic organizations from what we shall call “holistic”
organizations.
2
Recent technological advances and improvements in physical and human capital have
undoubtedly played a central role in driving the process whereby Tayloristic organizations
restructure into holistic ones. The increasing use of computers to transmit information
within firms and the rising versatility and programmability of equipment have increased the
complementarities across tasks (e.g. production, marketing, customer service, product
design) that a given employee can exploit. Furthermore, the growing amounts of all-round
knowledge that has been disseminated through the education systems over the past few
decades has made young people increasingly capable of performing multiple tasks. This
accumulation of human capital has also changed people’s preferences away from the
monotonous, single-purpose Tayloristic jobs to the frequently more varied and stimulating
holistic ones.
In what follows, we examine the consequences of these developments for the
reorganization of work, the move towards multi-tasking and the consequent break-down
of occupational barriers, the transformation of job opportunities, and the implications for
inequality in the labor market.
I. The Reorganization of Work
In standard microeconomic theory, the production function is a black box in which a
vector of inputs is transformed into a vector of outputs, and the allocation of tasks among
workers is not specified explicitly.
3 To examine the effect of the restructuring process on
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labor market inequality, however, we need to look into this black box. When different
workers in a Tayloristic organization perform different tasks, the distribution of wages
across workers clearly depends on the distribution of productivities across tasks. But when
the organization of work is restructured along holistic lines, so that individual workers are
assigned multiple tasks, the link between the distribution of wages and the distribution of
task productivities is broken. The reason, clearly, is that the distribution of task
productivities no longer coincides with the distribution of productivities across people.
To distinguish clearly between these distributions, it is convenient to express the
firm’s production function in two alternative ways, one in terms of tasks and the other in
terms of people. For simplicity, suppose that the firm has a production function in which
two types of labor are employed at two tasks to produce a homogeneous output. Let nj be
the number of type-j workers that the organization employs, let tij be the fraction of
worker j’s available time devoted to task i, where t1j + t2j = 1; and let  eij be the
productivity of the type-j worker at task i (per unit of time). Then ei1t i1n1 + ei2t i2n2 is the
amount of labor services devoted to task i, and the production function in task space (i.e.
in terms of activity level by task) is
qf e ne ne ne n =+ - - + 11 11 1 12 22 2 21 11 1 22 22 2 11 tt t t bg ch bg ch , (1a)
where f1, f2 > 0 and f11, f22 < 0 (positive, diminishing returns to the two activities).
Furthermore, (e1jt1j + e2jt2j)nj is the amount of labor services performed by the type-j
workers, and the production function in people space (i.e. in terms of workers) is
qg e e ne e n =+ - - + 11 11 21 11 1 12 22 22 22 2 11 tt t t bg ch bg ch , (1b)
g1, g2 > 0 and g11, g22  < 0 (positive, diminishing returns to labor).
Suppose that type-1 workers have a comparative advantage at task 1, and type-2
workers have a comparative advantage at task 2, so that (e11/e21) > (e12/e22). Moreover,
assume that the productivity of worker j at task i depends on his exposure to the task: eij =
eij (tij). In Lindbeck and Snower (1995a), this relation is rationalized as a tradeoff between
(i) the “return to specialization” whereby a worker’s productivity at a task rises with the
fraction of the available working time spent at that task, and (ii) an “informational task
complementarity” whereby the worker’s productivity at a task depends positively on the
information and skill gained from the time spent at another task. For all tij where the return
to specialization dominates, the productivity function eij = eij (tij) is monotonically4
increasing; and for all tij where the informational task complementarity dominates, the
function is decreasing.
4
Let the firm’s labor cost be cw nw n =+ 11 22 , where wj is the real hourly wage for
type-j labor.
5 Then firm’s decision problem is to maximize p = q - c, with respect to nj and
tjj, subject to tt jj ij ij += ¹ 1,  and the predetermined wages wj. Given that the solution
lies in the range njj j >< £ 00 1 , t , the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for profit maximization
are
(/ ) ¶p ¶nj = 0   and   ( / ) ¶p ¶t jj ³ 0,  ( / )( ) ¶p ¶t t jj jj 1 0 - = (2)
The first condition of (2) determines the number of people employed and is quite standard.
The second describes the choice of work organization by determining the allocation of
each worker’s time across tasks. If the profit maximization problem has an interior
optimum with respect to tjj (so that 0 1 << t jj
*  for j = 1,2, where t jj
*  is the profit-
maximizing tjj), then the firm chooses a holistic organization of work. But if the profit
maximum is attained at a corner point t 11 1
* =  and t 22 1
* = , the Tayloristic organization is
chosen.
Figure 1 depicts profit in terms of the time allocation (tjj) of a particular worker,
taking account of the constraint t1j + t2j = 1 and holding the time allocation of the other
type of worker at its profit-maximizing level. If a firm’s profit opportunities are given by
the curve p
1, then it will choose a Tayloristic organization of work, since the profit
maximum is achieved when t jj
T =1. If another firm’s profit opportunities are given by the
curve p
2, then that firm will choose a holistic organization, since profits are maximized
when 0 1 << t jj
H . The latter profit curve is depicted as hump-shaped,
6 which occurs when
the marginal return to specialization dominates the informational task complementarity at
low values of tjj, but the informational task complementarity dominates at high tjj.
Observe that when the organization of work is Tayloristic, the production functions
(1a) and (1b) are identical, since t12 = t21 = 0. Then it is clearly unnecessary to distinguish
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between production functions in task space and people space. But under holistic
organization, the two production functions are distinct, since the productivity of a
particular task can no longer be identified with the productivity of a worker.
In this context it is easy to see how the process of restructuring Tayloristic
organizations into holistic ones can be driven by three major improvements in physical and
human capital: (i) advances in information technology that increase informational task
complementarities, (ii) advances in production technologies that increase the technological
complementarities given by the magnitudes of the cross-partial derivatives f12 and f21, and
(iii) advances in human capital that make workers more versatile, reducing workers’
comparative advantages, so that e11/e21 falls and e12/e22 rises. These changes all raise profit
per worker and, if they are large enough, they reduce the fraction tjj at which profit per
worker is maximized. Reinterpreting Figure 1 in time-series terms (rather than in cross-
section terms, as above), these advances raise the profit curve and shift its maximum to the
left, so that the corner point solution t jj
T =1 turns into an internal solution 0 1 << t jj
H . The
reason for the latter effect is that the opportunity cost of a rise in tjj is the corresponding
fall in the fraction of time spent at the other task (tij, ij ¹ ), and the above advances in
physical and human capital all raise this opportunity cost. As result, in Figure 1, the p
1
curve is gradually transformed into the p
2 curve. Thus, if the above changes are sufficiently
large, Tayloristic organizations are induced to restructure along holistic lines.
II. Labor Market Inequality
The analysis above can shed light on how the restructuring process affects labor
market inequality. Our theme is that this process creates increasing demand for versatility
and thereby “re-segments” the labor market. We argue that where this restructuring
occurs, inequality in wages and job opportunities will come to depend less on workers’
productivities at specific task-specific occupations and more on their degree of versatility
across tasks.
To explore this theme in a simple way, let the production function of each firm take
the form:
qe n ij ij j
j i
= å å t ,  i,j = 1,2 (3)6
For simplicity, we assume that each Tayloristic firm offers n
T jobs,
 7 with (n
T/2) of
them at task 1 and (n
T/2) at task 2, and that workers have the same productivity at both




T. Let the wage be the outcome of a Nash bargaining
process
8 between each employer and employee, in which the employee receives a
proportion m (where 0 < m < 1) of the relevant surplus:
we T =m11 1 ( ) (4a)
leaving each Tayloristic organization with a profit of
pm
TT en =- 11 11 bg ( ) (5a)
The holistic firm is assumed to employ fewer people than the Tayloristic one: n
H <
n
T. (Lindbeck and Snower (1995a) derive this difference from the observation that
Tayloristic organizations characteristically have larger fixed costs of operation and thus
larger returns to scale than holistic organizations.) Assuming that the two types of workers
have symmetric productivities (so that e11(t11) =  e22(t22) and e21(1- t11) = e12(1-t22) for 0 <
t11 = t22 <1), it then suffices to focus just on the type-1 worker, since the type-2 worker
must have the same productivity and wage in equilibrium. Thus the production function of
the holistic organizations may be expressed as q = e11×× t 11
H n
H + e21× - × ( ) 1 11 t
H n
H  for 0 < t 11
H
< 1. The resulting wage is
we e
HH H =× + × - mt t 11 11 21 11 1 () ch (4b)
and the associated profit of each holistic organization is
pm t t
HH H ee =- × + ×- () ( ) 11 11 11 21 11 ch n
H (5b)




11 11 21 11 1 ×+× - tt () ch , so that all workers are employed in Tayloristic organizations.
Let the labor force be a constant L and let there be L/n
T Tayloristic organizations, so that
there is full employment. There is no labor market inequality in this initial equilibrium, since
all workers are assumed to have equal productivities. In practice, of course, productivities
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differ across task-specific occupations, and thus the wages at Tayloristic firms will differ
correspondingly. This does not mean however that our analysis, based on equal
productivities, will necessarily overstate the degree to which restructuring generates
inequality between versatile and non-versatile workers; on the contrary, as we shall see, the
analysis may well understate it.
The ongoing advances in physical and human capital, described in Section I, raise the
productivity per worker at holistic organizations  ee
HH
11 11 21 11 1 tt +- () ch  relative to the
productivity at Tayloristic ones (e11 1 ( ) ) and, as result, they raise the holistic profit (5b)
relative to the Tayloristic profit (5a). We assume that Tayloristic organizations differ in
terms of their costs of restructuring into holistic ones. Ordering all Tayloristic
organizations in terms of these costs, from the highest to the lowest restructuring cost, we
let the marginal organization’s restructuring cost (r) in terms of the number of Tayloristic
organizations (M
T) be r = r(M
T), r’ < 0. Thus the profit of the marginal restructured
organization is
pp r
TH H T M =- ( ) (5c)
Starting from the initial equilibrium in which MT = L/n
T, it is clear that once the
cumulative advance in physical and human capital is large enough to raise the profit (5c)
from restructuring above the profit (5a) from remaining Tayloristic, the restructuring
process begins. We assume that the labor force L contains L
v
 versatile workers (capable of
performing both tasks, as in Section I) and L
n non-versatile ones (i.e. capable of
performing only one task), where L
v, L
n > 0, L
v + L
n = L . Then the equilibrium condition
for the restructuring process is that Tayloristic organizations proceed to restructure into
holistic ones until either (a) the stock of versatile workers is exhausted or (b) the profit
(p
TH) from restructuring is equal to the profit (p
T) from remaining Tayloristic, i.e. by (5a)
and (5c),
() ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 11 1 1 11 11 21 11 11 - + --= - mt t r m ee n M e n
HH H T T ch bg (6)
This equation shows that as ee
HH
11 11 21 11 1 () ( ) tt +-  rises relative to e11(1), the number of
Tayloristic organizations (M
T) falls and the number of holistic ones rises accordingly.
This process generates two types of labor market inequality. First, the holistic wage
w
H  (in (4b)) rises relative to the Tayloristic wage w
T (in (4a)), and thus the versatile
workers in holistic organizations earn progressively more relative to the others. Second, as8
the Tayloristic firms restructure, they shed jobs. Then, even if holistic firms enter the labor
market, the non-versatile workers who have been layed off will be unable to avail
themselves of the new job opportunities. Thus the labor market comes to be segmented
into three sectors: an expanding holistic sector where wages are rising, a contracting
Tayloristic sector with wages are relatively stagnant, and an expanding pool of the jobless.
The resulting rise in inequality is pictured in Figure 2. In the initial, Tayloristic
equilibrium all workers are employed at the same Tayloristic wage, and thus the
corresponding Lorenz curve is LC0, coinciding with the 45
o line. The restructuring process
then progressively enlarges the holistic group and the jobless group at the expense of the
Tayloristic group, moving the Lorenz curve
9 from LC0 to LC1 and further to LC2. (The
figure assumes that the holistic wage (w
H) exceeds the Tayloristic wage (w
T) and that the
unemployed receive no wage income.) Thus the  people at the lower end of the wage
distribution capture a progressively smaller share of total wage income, whereas those in
the upper end capture a larger share.
Of course, this rising inequality in wages and job opportunities is mitigated through
an increased supply of versatile workers (through the services of the education system).
The greater this supply,  the more high-wage jobs and the less unemployment will be
created.
We do not think that these conclusions concerning inequality are overstated on
account of our simplifying assumption that productivities are uniform across the Tayloristic
sector. In practice, people in the high-wage occupations are often more versatile than
people in the low-wage occupations,
10 and this feature tends to magnify the extent to
which the restructuring process generates wage disparities.
III. Concluding Remarks
The theory outlined here can be seen as a potential first step towards providing a
new understanding of a constellation of seemingly disparate phenomena: the increased
versatility of work, the widening dispersion of wages within occupational, educational, and
job tenure groups in the US and the UK, accompanied by a narrowing of the male-female
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wage differentials, decline in the importance of centralized bargaining relative to firm-level
bargaining in many European countries, the growing importance of broad-based education
in improving people’s job opportunities, the reorganization of firms from task-oriented
departments to customer-oriented teams, and the break-down of occupational barriers. Our
approach to these phenomena may be summarized as follows.
The analysis above suggests how the growing versatility of workers and the
increasing complementarities among tasks induce firms to switch from organizations where
workers specialize by occupation to ones where they rotate among multiple tasks. This
inevitably entails a blurring of occupational lines. In the restructuring process, decision-
making within firms is decentralized, permitting the emergence of customer-oriented teams
which are inherently responsive to the changing customer needs. The decentralization also
leads to cost saving through shedding of middle management positions.
Our analysis also has striking implications for wage formation, and particularly for
the role of wage incentives for promoting the reorganization of work. Although the
analysis above has ignored this role by assuming that firms determine workers’ tasks
unilaterally, Lindbeck and Snower (1995b) show how the increasing importance of wage
incentives to promote efficiency in multi-tasking undermines centralized bargaining. The
reason is straightforward.  A usual objective of centralized bargaining is “equal pay for
equal work”, and this it invariably imposes some uniformity of wages across workers for
given tasks. When the organization of work is Tayloristic, with different occupational tasks
performed by different workers, then rewarding people in accordance with marginal
products in task space need not be grossly inefficient, particularly if workers within a
particular occupation have similar productivities. But when work is restructured along
holistic lines, this practice can become very inefficient indeed, for when different employees
perform different sets of complementary tasks, there is no reason to believe that the
marginal product of one employee’s time at a particular task should be similar to the
marginal product of another employee’s time at that task. For instance, there is no reason
that time spent with customers should affect the productivity of a product designer in the
same way as it affects the productivity of a production worker. Thus holistic firms have an
incentive to set wages in accordance with marginal products in people space and therefore
to offer different workers different wages for the same task. But this is precisely the
practice that centralized wage bargaining inhibits. In this way, the restructuring process10
raises the efficiency costs of centralized bargaining and thus gives employers and
employees growing incentives to choose decentralized bargaining arrangements instead.
This, however, may be expected to increase wage dispersion in countries where centralized
bargaining has compressed the distribution of wages.
Furthermore, insofar as women tend to specialize less in terms of skills than men, our
analysis offers a new explanation for the narrowing male-female wage differentials and
nonemployment differentials. And finally, insofar as people within given occupational,
educational, and job tenure groups differ substantially in terms of their versatility as well as
the social and cognitive skills necessary for success in holistic organizations, our analysis
also offers a new explanation for the widening wage dispersion within these occupational,
educational, and job tenure groups.11
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Footnotes